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CJLG December 2017 5  Third, many SDGs include multiple components that must be addressed collectively in specific jurisdictions, as embodied in SDG 11. Given their proximity to local residents, LRGs have more potential and motivation than national actors to think holistically about integrated territorial development, as highlighted by the Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) and others (CLGF 2007 (CLGF , 2013 Romeo 2011; EC 2016) . In addition, while SDG 11 is the only SDG that specifically targets LRGs, 103 of the 169 SDG targets (61%) are considered relevant to cities or have a component and will need action at the local level (Greene and Meixell 2017, p. 10) . National actors need to elaborate frameworks and provide support, but LRGs can often take the lead role in developing and managing integrated sustainable development plans to inclusively meet the needs of their constituents.
 Fourth, many SDGs centre on alleviating prominent and interconnected global conditions that pose significant challenges to sustainable development -global warming, financial instability, energy deficiencies, health crises, and food insecurity, among others. International and national government measures are clearly essential, but LRGs have already taken action on these fronts in some countries and are well situated to develop additional innovative responses -through climate adaptation policies, energy conservation, green growth strategies, and local resource mobilisation, among others (see, for example, UCLG 2014).
All LRGs can help advance the SDGs, but urban areas are especially prominent. Cities drive economic growth -urban areas commonly produce a quarter or more of GDP in both high-income countries and low-and middle-income countries. Nearly half of the global population is already urban, and urbanisation is expected to near 85% in industrialised countries and 64% in developing countries by 2050 (see, for example, UNDESA Division for Sustainable Development 2015). The urban record in creating jobs, delivering services and promoting sustainability, however, is uneven, and low-income countries face acutely severe challenges (see, for example, McGranahan and Satterthwaite 2014). To achieve Agenda 2030 cities will need to be able to take a lead in ensuring equitable economic growth, planning for resilience and climate adaptation, and encouraging innovation and social integration.
If LRGs are to maximise their developmental impact, countries require robust intergovernmental frameworks and policies that empower, finance, motivate and support LRGs and citizens. Current systems, even in high-income countries, exhibit weaknesses or need updating, and capacity deficits can be large, especially in low-income countries. Particularly striking are limitations on the revenue side -own-source revenues, intergovernmental transfers, and development finance -and unfunded expenditure mandates are not uncommon.
Much has been written and considerable action taken to improve fiscal decentralisation (Bahl et al. 2013 ; UN-Habitat 2015) . Some reforms have helped, but many fall short, especially in low-and middle-income countries. Weaker than expected performance results from various factors -
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CJLG December 2017 6 inadequately contextualised design, unrealistic expectations, haphazard implementation, and political forces, including central reluctance to empower LRGs and local political dynamics. Conventional approaches to fiscal decentralisation are useful, but their application -and their relevance for the SDGs -must recognise the challenges to be overcome and the extensive variations in goals, structures, functions, capacities and performance across and within countries. 3 Many considerations are relevant for defining and realising a stronger LRG role in the SDGs. This article focuses on four.
 First, decentralisation reforms are often unduly standardised and inadequately coordinatedmore contextually sensitive and holistic reforms could enhance synergies among intergovernmental system elements and improve results.
 Second, efforts to improve LRG finance are often inadequate and piecemeal -greater focus on integrated resourcing can support development and the SDGs.
 Third, despite the value of a more holistic and integrated approach to framing reform, not everything can be done at once -crafting a pragmatic implementation strategy is essential for even the best designed reforms.
 Finally, the prominence of the SDGs raises a productive opening to rethink fiscal decentralisation reforms that have not gained traction on their own merit.
Contextually grounding and integrating decentralisation reforms
Reforms to improve intergovernmental systems and enhance the role and performance of LRGs are common, but they are often based on simplified general principles. These can lead to overly homogeneous reforms and do not provide LRGs with flexible tools to address their distinct development needs (see Bahl et al. 2013 and Smoke 2015a) . In addition, many reforms target specific elements of the system -for example by focusing on either the expenditure or revenue side, only addressing policy design or implementation and management, etc. A principle-driven and targeted approach is pragmatic, but reforms must also account for specific characteristics of each country and LRG, and even narrow reforms must be structured to work harmoniously within the larger intergovernmental system. Decentralisation is framed as assigning public functions to LRGs along with systems and funds to support implementing these responsibilities to meet public goals. 4 Its multiple forms and accountability channels are well known -deconcentration (local units of higher levels), devolution (elected LRGs with semi-autonomous powers) and delegation (certain function(s) contracted to a LRG or private entity) -as are the key dimensions: administrative, fiscal and political. These dimensions cannot be treated independently if decentralisation benefits are to be achieved, e.g. There have been recent efforts to promote a broader view of decentralisation that advocates empowering LRGs to meet a general mandate to develop and provide for the welfare of their territories rather than simply to assume roles and functions assigned to them by the central government (CLGF 2013; Romeo 2011; EC 2016) . Often referred to as developmental local government, such an approach sees LRGs as proactive drivers of integrated development, which reinforces their role in supporting the SDGs. This way of operating, however, places greater demands on LRGs.
As per the 'finance follows function' principle, each level needs adequate funding to meet its obligations and general development mandate, which is often a challenge (more below). Effective fiscal decentralisation also depends on systems to manage generation and expenditure of LRG resources, including public financial management (PFM) and fiscal responsibility frameworks. Much effort has been devoted to developing such mechanisms, including use of new technologies for assembling and using information. Relations among units at a particular level, including within key metropolitan areas, can range from well-coordinated to highly fragmented, shaping service delivery across multiple jurisdictions (Slack 2015) . Other governmental (e.g. service delivery boards) and/or private actors may have specific responsibilities, and these may or may not be well linked to LRGs. In some cases, other actors trespass on the legally defined functional territory of LRGs.
Small island developing states (SIDS) face particular challenges in that they are often characterised by fragmented and weak administrations and governance structures, few sources of revenue, small populations, and in island atolls large distances between jurisdictions, limiting opportunities to take advantage of economies of scale (CLGF 2015) . They also face significant impacts from climate change and have limited resilience to economic or environmental shocks. In such environments LRGs are on the front lines in terms of service delivery but have limited financial tools at their disposal, and the blurring of responsibilities between central and local administrations can add to the challenges.
In short, decentralisation and LRG performance must be understood in terms of the institutional framework in a specific country and the formal and informal relations among differentially empowered levels and units of government and other governmental and nongovernmental actors.
Without such an understanding, it is not possible to fully explain LRG performance, to interpret properly the factors that shape it, or to develop meaningful and sustainable reforms intended to improve it. In some cases, major changes in institutional structures could be justified, but only a few countries (e.g. Kenya, Nepal and South Africa) have managed such politically sensitive restructuring.
Requirements and options for subnational government finance
Finance is critical for the SDGs, and subnational finance has been characterised as the missing link in sustainable development finance (UCLG 2015) . Dedicated policies and focused analyses are needed, but so is an understanding of how these elements interact. Are there adequate resources to finance a new LRG function? Might transfers discourage own-source revenue generation and borrowing even when use of these options is viable? Are some actions more fundamental or higher priorities or more feasible than others? On balance, it is important to consider reforms in a more integrated and strategic way, even though specific reforms ultimately require dedicated attention.
Options, starting points and trajectories will depend on current and evolving economic and fiscal conditions in each country, including the economic base, the level of development of capital markets and the availability and nature of international assistance in poorer countries. Thus, although promoting greater LRG financial capacity and autonomy is generally desirable, appropriate provisions in a particular country will vary, and they should be expected to change over time as relevant conditions evolve to promote stronger economic development and create better access to capital markets.
Another critical concern is that individual countries are comprised of a range of LRGs with different needs and capacities -ranging from metropolitan and secondary cities to small towns and rural areas -that require varying mixes of finance policies and instruments. Some LRGs (especially urban) have greater opportunities to raise resources, while in other cases, transfers will be more important.
Similarly, in some countries at least a number of LRGs will be able to tap capital markets, while for others central government support of LRG borrowing and development finance more generally will be required.
The SDG/FfD agenda has focused on development finance, particularly borrowing and private finance for LRG investment. This is appropriate but not sufficient for LRGs to engage effectively in the SDGs. LRGs also need adequate authority over infrastructure development if they are to be responsible for it. They will be unable to take loans without managerial and fiscal capacity, including to raise revenues for operation and maintenance and debt service. The LRG development finance environment is especially challenging in many low-and middle-income countries. Thus, assessment of what is initially feasible and a strategy to build a sustainable LRG finance system -recurrent and capital -are essential.
The revenue landscape
Central governments have intrinsic advantages in revenue generation given the nature of productive revenue bases and administrative scale economies, while LRGs often have the edge in providing certain public services due to variations in needs and preferences across jurisdictions. This means that intergovernmental transfers are inevitably important to offset the typical revenue-expenditure imbalance, and how national resources are shared with LRGs is critical. Yet there is also a convincing case for LRGs to raise a reasonable portion of their funds. LRG revenue generation reduces pressure on national budgets, links the costs and benefits of services, raises funds to repay loans for infrastructure investment, and frees up national resources to assist LRGs with weaker fiscal capacity, among others.
Own-source revenues
The often high functional demands and restrictions on own-source revenues generation result in substantial differences between LRG expenditure responsibilities and revenue capacities. LRGs in middle-income and high-income countries may collect 20-30% or more of their total revenue. In lowincome countries, it is often 10% or less, although there are outliers and there can be much variation within countries. Generally, the superior revenue bases and capacity of major urban governments relative to smaller urban and rural jurisdictions allows them more fiscal independence, but not always.
In federal systems, urban governments' revenue authority can be constrained by state government control over local revenue policies and practices.
There is broad agreement that many central governments, especially in low-and middle-income countries, are cautious and decentralise fewer revenue sources than would be justified by fiscal principles and LRGs' needs (UCLG 2010 (UCLG , 2015 assessments, and tax increment financing, among others. Thus far LVC has been used more in highincome and stronger middle-income countries, e.g. Brazil, China, Columbia, and India, but there will be greater scope in low-and middle-income countries as urban growth advances and fiscal reforms to strengthen LRGs are adopted.
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers
LRGs in most countries -whether high-income countries or low-and middle-income countriessignificantly rely on intergovernmental fiscal transfers given the imbalance between appropriate expenditure and revenue decentralisation, although urban areas can be more fiscally independent.
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Transfers can improve LRG resource access and autonomy, as well as help to meet priority national development, service delivery and equity goals, including those embodied in the SDGs.
Several aspects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers systems merit consideration. First, given ownsource revenue constraints, LRGs require sufficient and predictable intergovernmental fiscal transfers.
There are many demands for public revenues, so central governments cannot fully provide for all LRGs, and the centre also needs flexibility to respond to macroeconomic conditions. Nevertheless, there has been a movement to define the total volume (pool) of intergovernmental fiscal transfers resources in a relatively predictable way to limit disruptive (and politicised) variations in the amount of national funds shared with LRGs.
5 Ingram and Hong (2012) , World Economic Forum (2014), Suzuki et al. (2015) , UN-HABITAT and IDB (2017) , and UNDESA and UNCDF (2017) review various experiences with land value capture. 6 Synthetic reviews of intergovernmental transfers include Bird and Smart (2002) and Shah (2013 Despite some of the trends, the practice of intergovernmental fiscal transfers is highly diverse. Many countries increasingly define rules for determining the annual intergovernmental fiscal transfer pool, e.g. basing it on a share of a set of taxes or national revenues sources (e.g. Ghana, Kenya, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines). In other cases, the intergovernmental fiscal transfers pool is still determined annually in the budget process (e.g. South Africa, Uganda) or set for a specific period of time (e.g. 
Financing development
Subnational governments account globally for nearly two-thirds of public infrastructure investment, about a third of which is financed with grants. 7 In low-income and many middle-income countries, grants tend to dominate. In some cases, a main general transfer programme covers recurrent and capital spending, while in others there are dedicated development transfers, some unconditional, but more commonly for specific sectors. These may be distributed for specific projects or by formula, and LRG matching contributions are not uncommon.
Access to loans from capital markets has been important in high-income countries, but in low-and middle-income countries this is an option primarily for selected larger cities, metropolitan governments and regions. Developing LRG borrowing channels can be achieved over time, but this requires reforms to strengthen the intergovernmental fiscal framework and to build LRG fiscal responsibility and creditworthiness. Where direct access to capital markets is not feasible, quasipublic financial intermediaries, such as municipal development banks/funds have been used. Many such entities have performed poorly, but often due to design flaws and politicisation that can be corrected where there is a genuine desire for reform.
There have in fact been efforts to improve LRG access to development finance. Some countries have developed new borrowing/fiscal responsibility frameworks and have been reinventing financial intermediaries for LRG lending that are more professional and operate on more market-based principles, as well as opening financial markets directly to eligible LRGs (see Ingram et al. 2013; Smoke 2013; UCLG 2015) . Other approaches to enhance LRG access to loans include, for example, risk mitigation strategies, such as central government credit guarantees, co-financing initiatives, secondary market support, bond banks and credit pooling (see Kehew et al. 2005; Matsukawa and Habeck 2007; FMDV 2015; AFD and UNDP 2016 The most critical challenge is how to 'graduate' weaker LRGs from grants and subsidised loans to greater use of credit markets. This requires some harmonisation in the use of grant and loan mechanisms. Wealthy urban governments should not receive grants and highly subsidised loans for self-financing projects -such funds should largely be reserved for weaker LRGs and projects that cannot directly recover costs. Weaker LRGs could be required to take modest loans to begin to build capacity and a path towards creditworthiness. Another issue is how to capitalise municipal development banks/funds, which might be achieved through an evolving mix of support from development partners and private sources.
Other mechanisms and approaches can also enhance infrastructure finance. LRG public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been challenging, especially in low-and middle-income countries, but they hold future promise (see Marin 2009; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011; Ingram et al. 2013; Suzuki et al. 2015) . A number of development partners, including the IFC, the African Development Bank and the multi-donor Cities Development Initiative for Asia and UNCDF, have supported or proposed various kinds of Project Preparation Facilities (PPFs) to promote local infrastructure investment. Concerns about PPFs include their focus on bankable large-scale projects and favouritism to the private sector over LRGs, but they may free up public funds for LRGs and potentially be modified for direct LRG use.
Strategic implementation 9
The types of reforms needed to expand or recalibrate intergovernmental and LRG finance systems to better support the SDGs will vary across countries. High-income countries with more established systems and capacities should be in a better position to adopt reforms. In many low-and middleincome countries where decentralisation is newer and capacity needs to be developed as reforms are rolled out, the challenges tend to be greater. What needs to be done may be some distance from current policies and practices on the ground. Moving too quickly or without careful planning may jeopardise reform initiatives and limit their intended results.
The first step is obviously to document the specific nature of the problem(s) to be addressed. Are It is impossible to exhaustively outline the needed analysis here -there could be many more questions, and a serious analysis would have to dig deeper. But developing a sense of answers to some basic questions can begin to suggest the types of additional inquiry required and to identify solutions that might be considered. At the same time, the relative severity of underlying problems and linkages among them need to be documented, at least to the extent that some operationally specific steps can be proposed that do more than adopt generic reforms routinely recommended to deal with typical problems. Once the nature of a problem has been identified and the factors underlying it have been documented, a pragmatic strategy for reform can be developed. This is potentially demanding, and there are many ways it could be done, again depending on context and which actor leads. If action were taken by the central government to enhance the powers and capacity of LRGs, for example, a strategy might include certain elements -starting points, incentives, and capacity development.
First, it would be important to identify starting points for the reform process. In some cases, there will be opportunities to take major steps quickly. In other cases, a more cautious approach would be indicated. Taking into account the results of the type of diagnostics suggested above, initial steps could engage motivated partners and focus on solutions more likely to realise quick wins. This requires prioritising reforms, perhaps focusing on basic tasks that do not excessively intimidate key power bases or overpower LRG capacity. It would of course be productive to identify something that is significant and visible enough to begin to move the system in a better direction and with potential to initiate a process that could sustain advances. Leadership from both central and local and regional governments in this phase of reforms is essential in building a shared vision and stakeholder buy-in for the starting point and more challenging steps to come.
A related concern is that national decentralisation reforms often assume LRGs to be similar and do not sufficiently distinguish among them. Treating those with limited capacity as being capable of assuming major functions tempts failure, while unduly controlling LRGs with demonstrated capacity and intent is wasteful and undercuts local accountability. Differential starting points (asymmetric decentralisation) can be constructive, such that these LRG variations are recognised in the reform process. Some reforms could even be negotiated with LRGs, placing some onus on them to observe steps they agreed to. Such an approach may also help ensure that LRGs will try to prepare for more responsibility and also improve the confidence of other stakeholders.
A further issue is that individual elements of LRG governance should ideally be linked to recognise the interdependencies outlined above, even if initially in a limited way. A fragmented reform approach targeting only limited aspects of the system may sometimes be effective, but it can also result in reforms that appear consistent with accepted principles and good practice but cannot independently create or sustain desired results.
Second, there is value in constructing both positive and negative incentives (rewards and penalties)
for central and local and regional actors to meet agreed measures. Where multiple actors (e.g.
ministries that must take actions to empower or support LRGs and/or international development partners who provide assistance), are involved, some institutional mechanism to oversee, support and There has also been an enduring bias on developing technical skills, which are obviously important, but governance capacity is also needed for sustainable reform. LRGs need to learn how to work more effectively with higher-level governments, their peers and their constituents, and elected and appointed LRG officials must also work effectively together. To some extent such needs are recognised in the push to improve accountability in multi-stakeholder environments, but consensus may be more on paper than in practice, and governance capacity may continue to be pursued in superficial and piecemeal ways.
Finally, the overall strategy needs to be consolidated. The trajectory of reform, which as noted above can have different starting points and paces, should ideally incorporate incentives and be directly linked to efforts to build capacity and improve performance over time. Technical reforms can be rolled out in a way that ties capacity development to specific functions that will be undertaken during a particular period. Reforms could progressively proceed based on well-defined criteria that make it clear what a LRG must do before being empowered with additional responsibilities or resources.
Such an approach can be challenging and may risk becoming overly bureaucratic, and in cases with more advanced systems in place and generally stronger capacity it will not be necessary. More thinking and effort in this direction, however, can often be productive, and it may reduce arbitrary or politicised decisions about moving on to next steps and limit stalling of LRG empowerment processes which is often experienced, especially in low-income countries.
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An implementation strategy will also be required for actions LRGs can take more independently of the national government. Even capable LRGs will often need to act strategically in adopting reforms that, for example, require major increases in taxes paid by local residents. One approach might be to tie revenue increases to specific benefits. If moving to full property valuation is intended and current valuations are low, assessment ratios could be phased in and tied to service improvements for local businesses and residents. Similarly, new user charges could move gradually towards cost recovery to avoid undesirable inequities, reductions in basic service use, adverse administrative impacts, political resistance, etc. New systems and procedures could also be tested through pilot initiatives, allowing experimentation and modification before wider adoption.
Linking fiscal decentralisation reforms to the SDGs
As emphasised throughout this article, fiscal decentralisation reforms have been pursued for decades, often with underwhelming or mixed results. 10 The emergence and prominence of the SDGs present an opportunity to weigh the implications of the SDGs for the strategic pursuit of decentralisation reforms. Assessing how to localise and implement the SDGs can also provide insights into how to prioritise and sequence decentralisation reforms, both fiscal and beyond. Pursuing reforms in this way may help to get traction on essential fiscal decentralisation reforms that have not taken root in previous incarnations.
Although there is a common set of SDGs, each country's particular challenges with respect to those goals, their relative priorities, and the potential for the current LRG system to help attain them varies considerably. Thus, the design and implementation of any reform programme needs to be country specific, considering context, politics, capacity and other factors noted above. National governments are at different stages of aligning their national development plans to the SDGs, but there will often be room for improving efforts to contextualise and pragmatically frame their SDG strategy.
Differences across countries also implies that a set of contextualised -rather than standardisedinstitutions and processes are needed to pursue the SDGs and shape the role of LRGs in doing so.
Each country will need to develop an approach to connect the SDGs to any relevant reshaping of intergovernmental structures, functions, resources and relations. Even with the SDGs as a focus, the process can determine constructive LRG reform strategies and support mechanisms. Although individual countries should drive the approach to the SDGs, many may need external support, especially in low-and middle-income countries, and all could benefit from a means to exchange country experiences.
If LRGs are to be key players in achieving the SDGs, several critical steps must generally be taken.
These measures must, of course, be properly tailored to the contexts and needs of specific countries and appropriately supported by the international community as requested by countries that need and desire assistance:
 First, LRGs will often need to be more robustly empowered to act not only more autonomously, but also as players in a multi-actor team. The degree of empowerment required will necessarily vary across and perhaps within countries.
 Second, LRGs need sufficient resources to carry out their functions. As discussed above, LRG revenue sources should be developed in an integrated way that ensures better operation of the overall system. Development finance is a priority for many SDGs, but it is dependent on overall fiscal capacity.
 Third, LRGs need increased incentives to operate transparently and in an accountable manner.
This means getting an appropriate balance between upward and downward accountability, which can evolve over time as LRGs improve capacity and results. Good information and monitoring are essential.
 Fourth, LRGs need capacity to function effectively and to act developmentally. Capacity needs will vary -both in terms of general LRG requirements and the demands of specific SDGs.
Another basic consideration is what type of strategic process is needed to move forward. Several elements would need to be considered:
 First, the starting point is to document the current situation in a particular country, including intergovernmental relations and contextual conditions that could support or hinder more effective LRGs. This is, of course, a very large area of inquiry, but it is important to have a general understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the intergovernmental system as per the discussion above.
 Second, SDG deficits should be identified. Some of these deficits would be related to the unmet potential role of LRGs in more specific SDGs, such as particular services, conflict management, or infrastructure, while others relate to more holistic issues such as economic growth, inequality and resilience.
 Third, based on previous assessments, it will be necessary to determine priority reforms and articulate pragmatic strategies for enhancing LRG systems and practices. The strategy should identify entry points, sequencing, and pace, as well as the types of incentives, support, and capacity building that might be required.
 Fourth, it is essential to develop institutions and processes for monitoring the progression of reforms and their relationship to the SDGs. Some standard benchmarks may be useful, but there is also room for negotiating some of them with LRGs. The results can be used to inform and enable adjustments to the reform objectives and the strategy itself as lessons are learned from experience.
Given the breadth and complexity of the SDGs and prominent differences in the LRG context and needs across countries, there is no single best approach to how LRGs can support the SDGs.
Moreover, there is no single best answer to the question of which intergovernmental system reforms have the greatest potential to improve the ability of LRGs to promote sustainable development.
Commonwealth members, like all countries, face the pressing and consequential challenge of making progress on this front. Creating and applying better diagnostics can help policymakers and practitioners to better understand current conditions and needs. Developing dynamic processes that make use of improved information and include relevant stakeholders in a meaningful way can support strategic advances in meeting the SDGs with greater contributions from more empowered, capable and motivated LRGs.
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